Supreme Court restricts use of obstruction charge in Jan. 6 cases including Trump

Supreme Court restricts use of obstruction charge in Jan. 6 cases including Trump

The Supreme Court is set to hear arguments on April 16 in a pivotal case involving Joseph Fischer, a former Pennsylvania police officer charged with multiple offenses related to the January 6, 2021, Capitol attack. Among the charges is the contentious obstruction of a congressional proceeding, a charge Fischer argues should be dismissed. Fischer contends that the law under which he was charged, part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, was intended solely for cases involving evidence tampering.

This case has broader implications, as over 300 other January 6 defendants, including former President Donald Trump, face similar charges. The Supreme Court’s decision could significantly impact these cases, particularly the obstruction charges against Trump, which are central to the indictment brought by Special Counsel Jack Smith.

Fischer’s actions on January 6 included sending text messages suggesting violence against Congress members and participating in the mob that pushed against police lines. He was arrested on February 19, 2021, and charged with assaulting officers and violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), which criminalizes obstructing, influencing, or impeding any official proceeding.

U.S. District Judge Carl Nichols initially dismissed the obstruction charge against Fischer, interpreting the law as limited to evidence tampering. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed this decision, with Judge Florence Pan asserting that the statute unambiguously applies to all forms of corrupt obstruction of an official proceeding.

Fischer’s appeal to the Supreme Court argues that Section 1512(c)(2) should only apply to cases involving evidence tampering. He contends that the specific acts of tampering listed in Section 1512(c)(1) should limit the scope of Section 1512(c)(2). Fischer also points to the law’s title, “The Corporate Fraud and Accountability Act,” and its legislative history, which he argues supports a narrower interpretation focused on evidence tampering.

The federal government, represented by U.S. Solicitor General Elizabeth Prelogar, counters that Section 1512(c)(2) is a catchall provision designed to cover all forms of corrupt obstruction of an official proceeding. The government argues that the statute’s broad terms, such as “obstruct” and “impede,” encompass various forms of conduct that hinder official proceedings.

The Supreme Court’s decision in this case could have far-reaching consequences. If the court sides with Fischer, hundreds of January 6 defendants could see their obstruction charges dismissed. This outcome would be a significant victory for these defendants and their supporters, including Trump, who argue they were unfairly targeted.

During the hearing, several justices expressed concerns about the breadth of the obstruction law. Justice Samuel Alito questioned the outer limits of the statute, while Justice Amy Coney Barrett asked about the potential for the law to be interpreted too broadly. Justice Neil Gorsuch and Alito also raised concerns about whether non-violent protests could be charged under the law.

Prelogar argued that the law’s limits are clear and that it applies to obstructing official meetings with corrupt intent, such as threatening violence. She emphasized that the law has not been used to charge brief protests and that the January 6 cases involved significant violence and intent to obstruct.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor appeared more sympathetic to the government’s position, suggesting that the manner of obstruction is less important than the fact of obstruction itself. She compared the situation to a theater where an audience member could be removed for obstructing a performance, regardless of how they did it.

The key legal dispute centers on the word “otherwise” in the statute, which Fischer’s lawyer, Jeffrey Green, argues limits the law to document destruction. Green warned that a broad interpretation could turn the law into a “dragnet” that could ensnare peaceful protesters. Prelogar, however, argued that “otherwise” serves as a catchall to cover various forms of obstruction.

The Supreme Court’s decision could also impact Trump’s case. Two of the four charges against him in his federal election interference case are based on the same obstruction law. Special Counsel Jack Smith has argued that even if Fischer’s interpretation prevails, Trump could still be charged based on other actions, such as recruiting alternate presidential electors.

Despite concerns about the law’s 20-year maximum sentence, Prelogar noted that sentences for January 6 defendants have been much shorter. The average sentence for violent defendants without a criminal history was 10 to 16 months, while non-violent defendants received six to 12 months. Among those whose only felony conviction was the obstruction charge, the average sentence was 26 months.

The Supreme Court’s ruling, expected by late June or early July, will be closely watched. It could reshape the legal landscape for hundreds of January 6 defendants and influence the course of Trump’s own legal battles.

Source: SCOTUSblog, USA Today

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Scroll to Top